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28 March 1967

CONCEPT  
for the  
Continuing Development & Application  
of  
Practical Intelligence Guidance for COMINT  
(Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming)

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
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OUTLINE OF THESE REMARKS

1. Context.
2. The Situation.
3. The Problem:
  - a. Identification of the rationale for the whole of the U. S. intelligence effort.
  - b. The targeting of COMINT.
4. What is being done in the COMINT field:
  - a. Inter-agency ad hoc review, 1964-1965.
  - b. January 1966 USIB decision to provide "Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming".
  - c. Application of the "new approach" and USIB-approved criteria.

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
CONTEXT

1. To assist in the maintenance of U. S. national security, at home and abroad.

2. To support U. S. operating interests in international affairs, at all echelons of concern and contact, by all Federal departments and agencies involved.


3. To provide a practical and coordinated method for the specification, at the USIB level, of effective U. S. intelligence operations.

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**SECRET**THE SITUATION

In the general absence of well defined and selected intelligence consumer (U. S. operating officials) needs, the intelligence community tends to assume the need to provide intelligence on all foreign affairs and activities.

THE PROBLEM

*1st*  
*We need to define fgl's*  
*with a technical*  
*monitoring*

-To provide a known, understood and sufficient basis for the substance of U. S. intelligence assessments and estimates of foreign affairs and activities significantly affecting U. S. interests.

-To provide a practical basis for action (intelligence collection and production activities) in response to agreed needs for information and intelligence.

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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

IDENTIFICATION OF THE RATIONALE FOR THE WHOLE  
U. S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT

1. From a substantive point of view:

a. The identification of:

- (1) That information we have to have for agreed purposes (either in direct support of U. S. operations or technical support of intelligence operations themselves).
- (2) That information which we know we have or are obtaining.
- (3) That increment of information which we know or estimate to be feasible to obtain.

b. The specification of a reasonable search for the new or unknown, e. g., evidence of a new major weapon threat to the U. S.

2. From a procedural point of view:

a. To ensure effective targeting of information collection sources:

(1) In respect to:

- (a) Essential needs for a technical capability (collection and processing).
- (b) Essential needs for information products in support of intelligence production currently.
- (c) Essential needs for additional information products in support of intelligence production during, and in the developing stages of, crisis situations.

(2) In consideration of such factors as:

- (a) Feasibility limitations of each source.
- (b) Costs in relation to the contribution of products which can be anticipated regularly.
- (c) Risks of action and inaction.

b. To ensure the production of intelligence responsive to known and foreseeable consumer (U. S. operating officials) needs.

c. To provide means to translate agreed substantive needs into responsive and balanced collection and production resource

*isn't what  
info you have*

*3 distinct systems:*

*tech. cy*

*current  
expansion -*

*war agents -*

*Basic idea for guidance  
+ start of response is that  
whatever it is, it is small  
has to be in line, but  
12 cable to the  
recovery mgr.*


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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

A CONTINUING NECESSITY

To identify, monitor and react to the relationships among:



2. To examine requirements, "guidance," resources and products individually and to evaluate their effectiveness, for example:

Requirements: (over)

- The priority of interests within major categories of consumers.
- The identification of "essentials" within the mass of "nice to have."

Guidance:

- Choices among collection sources.
- Validity, in relation to requirements.
- Practicality.

Resources:

- Technical system design capabilities and options.
- Efficiency.
- Balance between collection and production exploitation.

Products:

- Content and form.
- Timeliness and periodicity.

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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

WHAT HAS TO BE DONE, CONCEPTUALLY

Provide improved mechanisms and procedures to:

1. Reidentify and clarify the functions of the U. S. intelligence effort in relation to defined and agreed objectives.
2. Identify the purposes to be served by the production of intelligence.
3. Evaluate the present substantive holdings of production sources and the stream of incoming new information in relation to agreed needs for:
  - a. In depth topical research.
  - b. Current reporting on agreed categories of foreign affairs and activity.
  - c. Development and statement of national assessments and estimates, including early warning.
4. Identify and evaluate<sup>a/</sup> present performance, abilities, and any options available to U. S. and Allied collection and production sources in relation to agreed needs for information and intelligence, respectively.
5. Determine and provide practical intelligence guidance (establishing the statement of agreed needs) to collection and production sources based on assessments achieved in steps 1 through 4, above.
6. Assure appropriate justification of and follow-through action by intelligence activities, individually and collectively.
7. Assure responsive and complementary resource program action by managers of collection and production activities.

a/ - Including "cost-effectiveness" and "operations analysis" evaluations.

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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

CLARIFICATION OF  
FUNCTIONS—OBJECTIVES

Intelligence Functions	Categories of Intelligence Objectives		
	Tech. Capability	Intelligence Exploitation	
		Currently	In Crises & War
1. <u>Collection Sources:</u>			
a. Human:			
(1) Overt			
(2) Clandestine			
b. Technical			
(1) Photint			
(2) SIGINT			
(3) Other			
2. <u>Production Sources:</u>			
a. Dev. & Maintenance of Info/Data Base			
b. In depth research			
c. Current official reporting			
d. National Assess- ments/Estimates, including early warning			

Observables by:

Regions/countries/  
topics of interest

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Meanings by:

Countries/political  
groups:

a. Capabilities

b. Intentions

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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

THE TARGETING OF THE U. S. COMINT EFFORT

In relationship to agreed needs for information and the present and potential ability of other collection sources, what information (observables) can be made available practically and reliably from the COMINT source?

Note: A one to one relationship between foreign communications targets and the kinds of information contained in them (or information which can be derived from them) does not exist. Accordingly, in the development and statement of practical intelligence guidance it is necessary to understand and treat with both sides of the relationship.

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THE PROBLEM, cont'd:

THE QUESTION OF

DETERMINATION OF PRACTICAL  
INTELLIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR COMINT

What is, or should be, the relationship of the  
COMINT collection activity to the information  
to be produced by this source?

1. What is our knowledge of the target  
communications by: country, target user  
entity, mode of transmission and cipher  
system (if any)?

3. What is our present intercept  
coverage and processing exploitation of  
these target communications?

5. What additional coverage and  
exploitation is technically feasible?

7. What, if any, are the significantly  
different increments of additional and  
feasible intercept coverage and exploitation  
which could be undertaken; and what would  
be the associated costs and risks?

2. What are our requirements for  
information by country, appropriate to the  
COMINT source, in support of essential  
needs of U. S. operating officials?

4. What information is being produced  
from present COMINT coverage and exploi-  
tation? Is all of it useful and necessary?

6. What additional information is  
estimated to be available from communi-  
cations not under present coverage and  
routine exploitation?

8. What are the corresponding  
increments of information? What purposes  
would be served by the acquisition of the  
additional information, and would the end  
result warrant the associated costs and risks?

a. Intelligence Guidance: In what terms and in what degree of detail should USIB:  
(1) specify the types and extent of collection and exploitation capability to be maintained and used?  
(2) specify the scope, detail and timeliness of information to be reported?

b. Resource Management Guidance: In what detail should the Secretary of Defense and the DCI  
review and approve the collection and processing plan/program proposed, in response to  
USIB-approved guidance, for the COMINT source?

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**SECRET**WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THE COMINT FIELD?THE 1964-65 AD HOC REVIEW

## 1. Cause of the review:

a. Concern for the effectiveness and size of the U. S. intelligence effort expressed by the president, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the PFIAB and the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. DCI meeting with the Secretary of Defense, 13 December 1963, resulted in the following determinations:

- 1) Requirements approved by USIB are too broad and sweeping.
- 2) Costs and possible "trade-offs" should be identified prior to approval of requirements.
- 3) It is necessary to:
  - a) Take a look at all major intelligence activities, starting with NSA and SIGINT branches of the three Services.
  - b) Reduce or eliminate requirements.
  - c) Consider efficiency of operations.

## 2. The inter-agency ad hoc review of COMINT requirements:

a. Consisted of representation from State, DIA, CIA, NSA and BOB chaired by representatives of the DCI and SecDef.

## b. Concluded:

- 1) Need for USIB to:
  - a) State criteria to provide a basis for formulating "guidance" as distinct from "requirements."

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WHAT IS BEING DONE IN THE COMINT FIELD; cont'd:

b) Implement a NEW APPROACH for the formulation of Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming.

c) Serve as the sole source of Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming.

2) It is also necessary to:

a) Update guidance in accordance with intelligence needs, and in phase with programming and budget processes.

b) Reorient and strengthen staff and arrangements, within and between USIB agencies to provide intelligence guidance under the new approach.

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